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LABOR LAW-RIGHT To STRIKE-No-STRIKE CLAUSE BARS STRIKE
WHERE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE Is NOT SERIOUS IN NATURE.
Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc. (NLRB 1961).
Petitioner labor union was the bargaining agent of respondent de-
partment store's employees. The collective bargaining agreement between
petitioner and respondent required that no employee be discharged except
for cause, and provided a grievance system culminating in arbitration for
all disputes arising under the agreement. It also contained a standard
no-strike clause.1 Respondent's manager discharged a union steward be-
cause of union connected activities. Although the union offered to con-
test the discharge through the grievance system, the discharged steward
refused,2 and thirty-nine other employees staged a strike to protest the
discharge. After warning the strikers that they were in violation of the
no-strike clause, respondent discharged them3 and the union filed unfair
labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. The
trial examiner found that the discharge of the steward was a violation
of Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,4 but
that the striking employees were not engaged in protected concerted ac-
tivity under Section 7 of the Act,n and hence could lawfully be discharged.
The National Labor Relations Board, with one member dissenting, affirmed,
holding that the dispute was within the scope of the contract grievance
procedure and that, in striking in violation of the no-strike clause, the
employees were not protected by Section 7. Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc.,
133 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1961).
The National Labor Relations Act in Section 7 protects the right
of employees to engage in concerted activities for "mutual aid or pro-
tection," which includes the right to strike.6 Collective bargaining agree-
ments, however, frequently include "no-strike" clauses waiving this right
1. "The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement there shall be no
strikes, stoppages, or slowdown of work by the Union or any of its em-
ployees ... "
2. At this time there was a decertification contest, and it appeared that the
steward had circulated several petitions for another union.
3. The strikers were subsequently reinstated but without back pay.
4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 73
Stat. 519 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ......
5. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 73
Stat. 519 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958): "Employees shall have the right to . . .
engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection .... "
6. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 241, 59 S. Ct. 490 (1939);
NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950); Carter Carburetor Corp.
v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944); Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 139
F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc.,
130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
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of workers to enforce their economic demands.7 That a union can waive
the right to strike for the achievement of economic objectives is well-
settled, and employees striking in violation of such a clause are unprotected
by Section 7.8 In Shirley-Herman Co. v. Int'l Hod Carriers,9 the-Second
Circuit concluded:
The constitutional right of the employees to strike is not impaired
by their voluntary agreement to forego use of that weapon, nor do
no-strike clauses prevent the purposes of the . . .Act from being
carried out.' 0
Some courts have analyzed the no-strike clause from a contract point
of view, finding that the parties should be bound "to the same effect as
the parties to any other character of contract."" However, the question
of whether a no-strike clause is to be construed as prohibiting strikes for
other than economic reasons is a source of more difficulty. In United
Biscuit Co. v. NLRB' 2 the Seventh Circuit "doubted" that it would
matter whether the breach of the clause was caused by the employer's
unfair labor practices. However, the National Labor Relations Board
in Scullin Steel Co.' made special reference to the fact that the strike was
not caused by any employer unfair labor practices in dismissing a com-
plaint against the company for discharging employees who had
violated a no-strike clause. The following year, in citing the
Scullin case, the Board again found that in the absence of any employer
unfair labor practices, the employees were not protected by the Act in
breaching their contract. 14 In National Electronics Products Corp.,15 how-
ever, the Board appeared to modify this rule. In that case, the strike
was caused by the discharge of an employee in a factual situation quite
similar to that in the present case. The Board held that, since there
was an established grievance procedure, there was a breach of the agree-
ment and the employer was privileged to discipline the strikers.' 6
No convincing argument has been made . . . to regard this
[the unfair labor practice] ... as sufficient justification for overriding
7. E.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 76 S. Ct. 349(1956); Ezrine, Nadir of the No-Strike Clause, 8 LAB. L. J. 769 (1957).
8. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S. Ct. 509 (1939).
9. 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950).
10. Id. at 809. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 237,
59 S. Ct. 206, 220 (1938), where Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in commenting on
such a provision in relation to the Act stated: "Moreover the fundamental purpose of
the Act is to protect interstate . . . commerce from interruption and obstruction
caused by industrial strife. This purpose appears to be served by these contracts
in an important degree .. . [P]recluding strikes and providing for the arbitration of
disputes, these agreements are highly protective to interstate ... commerce."
11. United Biscuit Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1942). See alsoNLRB v. Columbia E. & S. Co., 96 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 292,
59 S. Ct. 501 (1939) ; Nat'l Linen Service,* 48 NLRB 171 (1943) ; Cox, The Legal
Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. Rlv. 1, 17 (1958).
12. 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942).
13. 65 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1318 (1946), aff'd as modified, 161 F.2d 143 (8th Cir.
1947).
14. Joseph Dyson & Sons, 72 N.L.R.B. 443, 447 (1947).
15. 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948).
16. Id. at 999, 1000.
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the salutary objectives of a no-strike clause . . . . In our opinion
. . . the purposes of the Act can best be effectuated by requiring
employees to honor their no-strike commitments and rely on the
remedial processes of the Board. 17
Thus, the Board seemed to conclude that, where there were such "remedial
processes," the employees had breached their contract and the employer
was free to discharge them notwithstanding the fact that the strike was
precipitated by an unfair labor practice. In NLRB v. Wagner Iron
Works,18 however, the Seventh Circuit rejected this interpretation that
a no-strike clause necessarily bars any strike for any cause:
The no-strike clause must be interpreted in the light of other terms
of the contract. Since the contract does not purport to reach all
conceivable phases ... . this clause can not well be interpreted as
a surrender of the right of self-help, as a measure to protest against
unfair labor practices.1 9
Thus the court concluded that, since the contract did not include any-
thing concerning unfair labor practices, a strike provoked by such prac-
tices was not covered by the no-strike clause.
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 20 adopted the approach of Wagner by de-
claring that the issues involved must be answered by an interpretation
of the particular contract.2 1 In Mastro, the employer tried to coerce its
employees into abandoning an incumbent union and joining a rival union,
and fired an employee who was persistent in his refusal to do so. 2 2 The
Court construed the standard no-strike clause in the Mastro contract 21 as
not waiving the right to strike against the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices. "We believe that the contract taken as a whole deals solely with
the economic relationship between the employer and the employee,12 4 and
thus the contract could not cover the unfair labor practice strike. The
Court also classified Mastro's coercive action as "flagrant" in that it was
17. Id. at 1000.
18. 220 F2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955).
19. Id. at 140.
20. 350 U.S. 270, 76 S. Ct. 349 (1956).
21. Id. at 279, 76 S. Ct. at 356.
22. Another union began a campaign among Mastro's employees. Due to its
alleged belief that this union was communist-controlled and that the incumbent
union was too weak to cope with the situation, the company suggested that the
latter union transfer its bargaining rights to a third union which the company
regarded as stronger. This suggestion was refused and the company started a very
active movement to obtain this end, in the course of which certain employees who
received membership cards in the new union were told that those who refused to
sign would be "out." One employee was fired due to his activity in support of
the incumbent union. This discharge precipitated a strike in violation of a no-
strike clause. Significantly, Mastro engaged in these acts while the incumbent
union was attempting to negotiate a new contract.
23. "The Union further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work
stoppage during the term of this agreement."
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a practice destructive of the very foundation of the collective bargaining
relationship. 25 However, the Court qualified this by stating that it as-
sumed that, by "explicit contractual provisions," the employees could
have waived the right to strike against such unfair labor practices.20
Thus it would appear that the usual no-strike clause will not waive the
right to strike against employer unfair labor practices, at least when
the latter are so serious as to threaten the existence of the bargaining
relationship.
Since 1956, the Board has twice had occasion to consider the impli-
cations of Mastro. In Mid-West Metallic Products,27 the contract con-
tained a clause forbidding strikes until the procedure for settling dis-
putes had been exhausted, which would take approximately five days; there
was no explicit waiver of the right to strike due to unfair labor prac-
tices. The Board in construing the contract held that such a clause was
a bar to unfair labor practice strikes until the grievance procedures were
complied with, since the union promised not to strike for only a short
period, while in Mastro there was such a limitation for the entire duration
of the contract. In 1961, in Ford Motor Co.,28 the Board affirmed the
findings of the trial examiner who had held that where there was a
discriminatory discharge, the Mastro rule should not be confined only to
serious unfair labor practices.
It would seem clear that the rigid enforcement of no-strike clauses
in connection with economic strikes is consistent with the basic policies
of the National Labor Relations Act2 9 in that it eliminates serious ob-
structions to the normal flow of commerce and at the same time does
not impair the right of collective bargaining. 80 The prevention of strikes
and the protection of the rights of the employee to organize and to con-
tract freely are, of course, principal objectives of the Act. The holding
of the Mastro case is a reasonable limitation on the enforcement of such
clauses. In the Mastro situation, the employer had engaged in a con-
certed course of unfair labor practices in order to dominate the employee's
selection of a bargaining agent. Such selection is, of course, central to the
right of free organization and collective bargaining. The Court emphasized
that such action constitutes a flagrant example of unfair practice,31 and
it clearly based its decision on a construction of the terms of the con-
tract :82 "[W]e conclude that the contract did not waive the employees'
right to strike solely-against the unfair labor practices of their employer."38
(Emphasis added). Essentially, this amounted to a finding that such a
25. Id. at 281, 76 S. Ct. at 357.
26. Id. at 279, 76 S. Ct. at 356.
27. 121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958).
28. 131 N.L.R.B. No. 174 (1961).
29. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 73
Stat. 519 (1947) 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
30. Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279, 76 S. Ct. 349, 356 (1956).
31. Id. at 279, 76 S. Ct. at 356.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 284, 76 S. Ct. at 358.
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flagrant violation could not have been in the contemplation of the parties
when they adopted the no-strike clause. One commentator has construed
the Mastro holding to mean that, in any contract where there has not
been an explicit provision so providing, the right to strike against any
unfair labor practice 3 4 has not been waived. If this is so, any isolated dis-
criminatory discharge opens the door to a strike with the resultant ob-
struction of commerce, even though the bargaining relationship itself is
unimpaired and the injured employee has ample remedies both under the
contract and before the Board. The Mid-West Metalcics"5 case supports the
approach to Mastro taken in the instant case. There the right to strike
was only waived for a very short length of time, and the Board held
Mastro inapplicable. To have held otherwise would have opened the
door to both "wild-cat" strikes and strikes for trivial reasons. Also, it was
reasonable to conclude that such a short waiver was intended to apply
even to unfair labor practice situations. A more difficult case to reconcile
is the Ford Motor Co. case.86 The majority of the Board now contends
that the reason they upheld the finding of the trial examiner in Ford
was due to the seriousness of the unfair labor practice involved.8 7 This
contention, however, finds little support in the Ford decision. Be that as
it may, the present case may clear up certain difficulties in construing
Mastro; it would appear that the employee has not waived his right to
strike and is acting within a protected area where: (a) there is a "flagrant"
unfair labor practice as defined in Mastro;38 (b) there is no clause ex-
pressly barring a strike in such a case, and (c) the terms of the con-
tract do not merely waive the right for a short period as in Mid-West
Metaleics. The principal difficulty with the result is the Board's criterion
of seriousness, to be applied in order to determine whether Mastro should
govern: "experience, good sense and good judgment." However, it would
seem that no other test is suitable. The Board certainly has the experi-
ence in situations of this type to make a practical determination as to the
seriousness of the unfair labor practices involved. The dissenting opinion
of Member Fanning argues that any discharge which is an unfair labor
practice under the Act is per se a serious matter. Such an approach,
while upholding one policy of the Act by giving maximum protection to
the organizational rights of workers, would also undermine the equally
basic objective of maintaining industrial peace. On balance, therefore,
the approach of the majority would seem more in line with the policies
enunciated by Congress.
Stuart Hubert Savett
34. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH.
L. R.v. 1, 17 (1958). For a contrary view see, Ezrine, Nadir of the No-Strike Clause,
8 LAB. L. J. 769, 796 (1957).
35. See note 28 supra.
36. See note 29 supra.
37. Footnote 14 of the majority opinion.
38. "Those practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining
must rest . . . " 350 U.S. 270, 281, 76 S. Ct. 349, 357 (1956).
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